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Abstract. It has been claimed that different types of causes must be 
considered in biological systems, including top-down as well as 
same-level and bottom-up causation, thus enabling the top levels to 
be causally efficacious in their own right. To clarify this issue, 
important distinctions between information and signs are introduced 
here and the concepts of information control and functional 
equivalence classes in those systems are rigorously defined and used 
to characterise when top down causation by feedback control 
happens, in a way that is testable. The causally significant elements 
we consider are equivalence classes of lower level processes, 
realised in biological systems through different operations having 
the same outcome within the context of information control and 
networks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
At the most general level, the issue of top-down causation can be seen as the problem 
of how higher levels of reality (roughly, levels of greater complexity
1
) can possibly 
have any causal effectiveness on lower levels [Simon 1962, Campbell 1974]. If it is 
assumed (according to the standard view in physics) that purely physical effects 
determine what happens at the lower levels and thereby also completely determine 
what happens at the higher levels, how can there be any real meaning to higher level 
causes and effects?  
 
Many scientists consider `top-down causation’ not to be real: they believe it is just a 
complicated way of describing things that in the end confuses the real causal patterns, 
which are believed to be bottom-up only (see Fig. 1a). It is also assumed that 
phenomena that are not easily understandable in a bottom-up way today, will be so 
understood in the future. This approach has been extended to all natural systems 
thanks to the huge success of the application of reductionist methodology in physics 
and, in recent decades, in molecular biology and neuroscience. As in Francis Crick’s 
famous dictum: "You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your 
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the 
behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules" [Crick 
1994]. The emphasis in the phrase “no more than” is a denial of the reality of 
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 Leaving aside its formal definition as that goes further than the scope of this paper. 
anything additional to the pure assembly of cells and is therefore also a rejection of 
top-down causation.  
 
A similar point of view comes from some emergence theorists, who suggest that, 
since complex systems can self-assemble from the bottom up, in biological systems 
there is no need for influence of the whole on the parts [Holland 1997]. In both cases 
the suggestion is that the introduction of top-down causation is misleading; the real 
causal powers reside in the lower-level physics and associated classical chemistry; 
they alone determine what happens. 
 
Nonetheless, there is a wide literature on the emergence of autonomous higher levels 
of complexity and the role of top-down causation in the hierarchy of complexity (see 
Clayton and Davies [2006], Murphy and Stoeger [2007] and references therein), 
expressing a need felt by many scholars to overcome traditional reductionism. 
Unfortunately, this discussion is mostly confined to philosophical considerations that 
has little changed the way scientists (especially physicists and molecular biologists) 
consider their own work.  
 
In this paper, we try to refine relevant concepts in order to translate a philosophical 
examination of top-down causation into a scientific program able to make predictions 
and experimental tests. As we shall see, there are already experiments that go in this 
direction, though they are not interpreted in the way we articulate here. The inquiry 
regarding top-down causation is somewhat different if we consider cases where 
consciousness and intelligence are involved, as distinct from those where they are not 
included. Additionally, important distinctions occur between the cases where life is 
involved, and those when only physical and chemical interactions occur. This paper 
will focus on the case of life at its most elementary level, but not on issues raised by 
intelligence and intention. We think that the concepts presented herein could be 
crucial for systematically addressing the problem of emergence of complexity and 
related evolutionary aspects, which we will consider elsewhere.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Bottom-up, Top-down and Same-level modes of action.  
1(a) The classical-standard view understands everything in the universe as happening in 
terms of bottom-up action only, so that efficient causation is seen essentially as bottom-up.  
1(b) A more careful view is to consider the bottom-up mode of action as providing a space of 
possibilities, the same-level mode (red arrows) as the true dynamic causation, and the top-
down mode (yellow arrows) as changing the causal relations below. Dynamic causation 
(same-level) can be both efficient and circular. Here, the circular one is shown, since it plays 
a more crucial role in the context discussed here.  While not represented in (a), circular 
causation can also be part of “bottom-up action only” models. 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A Recent Experiment 
 
A European team [Wegscheid et al. 2006] performed in vivo experiments of 
complementation on the bacteria E. coli and B. subtilis. These bacteria have distinct 
RNase P enzymes: type A for E. coli and type B for B. subtilis, respectively. 
Interestingly,  these RNases P have significantly different three-dimensional 
architectures (see fig.8) that are associated with important biophysical and 
biochemical differences in vitro: for instance, (1) B. subtilis P RNA 5’ and 3’ ends are 
autolytically processed after association with its protein subunit, while this process is 
enzyme dependent in E. coli; (2)Rnase P from B. subtilis but not E. coli forms dimers 
consisting of two RNA and two protein subunits; (3) B. subtilis RNase P holoenzyme 
binds to pre-tRNA with a much higher affinity than mature tRNA, whereas this 
difference in affinity is attenuated in E. coli; (4) type A and type B RNase P RNAs 
have distinct metal ion requirements. 
 
Now, despite these structural and functional differences in vitro, it was shown that 
types A and B can replace each other in vivo without loss in functionality, at least 
under standard growth conditions. It is interesting to stress that the lower physical-
chemical stability of hybrid holoenzyme complexes does not raises functionality 
problems. Already this shows that the traditional, reductionist point of view is 
insufficient. Indeed, the concept of function is now widely acknowledged in biology 
[see also Collins et al. 2007].  
 
The authors of the experiment interpret this situation by making the hypothesis that 
there could be “conserved features” of bacterial RNase P RNA and protein subunits 
essential for their primary functional activity in vivo. While this fact is difficult to 
deny based on the reality of a consensual core structure for Rnase P enzymes in all 
living organisms [Altman, 2007; Kirsebom, 2007], we however think that this 
explanation is only partial and hides a greater truth. In our opinion, their results can be 
seen in another light, by considering top-down effects through the information control 
that the unicellular organism exercises on and through these functions. In the 
following we propose this new conceptual framework.   
 
3. What is Top-Down Causation by Information Control? 
 
Generically, top-down causation works by higher-level conditions setting the context 
for lower level processes (see Bishop and Atmanspacher [2006], Campbell [1974], 
Clayton and Davies [2006], Murphy and Stoeger [2007], Ellis [2006a, 2006b], 
Deacon [2006]). Probably, already in physics and chemistry there are boundary 
conditions that act on lower-level processes. For this reason, top-down causation 
applies whatever level is chosen as the reference level, for there is no known 
ontologically preferred level (as we do not even know what the lowest level is, there 
is no known fundamental level). However, in the cases of physics and biology 
mentioned above, it is not always clear whether the traditional reductionist point of 
view is actually overcome, since these boundary conditions can again be understood 
as a complicated effect of much more elementary processes.  
 
Therefore, in this paper, we focus on a specific and stronger kind of top-down 
causation that plays a very relevant role in biology: top-down causation by 
information control. This does not mean that we think this is the only way top-down 
causation may be relevant within the biological domain (some other possibilities are 
discussed in Ellis [2008]). We shall show that top-down causation by information 
control may be clearly found in biological organisms already at the most elementary 
bio-molecular level, suggesting that there is not the possibility to reinterpret these 
results in reductionist terms.  
 
3.1 Some Basic Definitions 
Top-down causation by information control is the way a higher-level instance 
exercises control of lower level causal processes through feedback control loops 
making use of functional equivalence classes of operations. At the biological level, 
this consists in applying controlling signals from the higher level to influence the 
lower level items’ proper mode of action (Fig. 1b). Here, a signal is any variation or 
pattern in a physical or chemical medium that can convey information or be treated as 
a sign. If we succeed in showing meaningful evidence that this stronger form of top-
down causation already happens at the bio-molecular level, we have also succeeded in 
showing that this occurs in all living systems. Even stronger versions of top-down 
causation can be found when intentionality and free will are involved; however, as 
already pointed out, we confine our examination here to the most basic biological 
domain.  
 
A key concept here is that of equivalence class of lower-level operations,
2
 discussed 
in Sec.4 below, where operations occurring in biological systems can be considered as 
coordinated space-time pathways of physical-chemical interactions. The criterion for 
an equivalence class of operations is the outcome that an operation brings about 
relative to an established goal: if two different operations give the same outcome, they 
can be considered equivalent. Thus, what is of concern here are functional 
equivalence classes (sets of operations that produce the same outcome). 
 
Another central point is, of course, information control (Sec.5). In general, 
information control is the ability to use signals to attain or maintain a specific goal. 
When different forms of information control are possible, functional equivalence 
classes are what really counts, since they gather together the possible different 
operations by which the goal can be attained. Let us stress that any control mechanism 
is ultimately control in terms of information, even though it makes use of some energy 
or material to convey that information. Information is consequently a dominant factor 
for life [Küppers, 1990; Rasmussen et al, 2004; Roederer 2005]. Our point is that the 
demonstration of the existence in biological systems of functional equivalence classes 
under information control from above can be seen as strong evidence of top-down 
causation affecting its lower level modes of operations from a higher level of 
functional organization. 
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 This notion was already introduced into psychology by Lashley [1942] and into neural sciences by 
Hebb [1949, pp. 38-59], and see also Pearl (1998, 2000).  
3.2 On the Nature of Causes 
The general nature of causation is a key issue, in considering these topics. The 
majority of scientists think that top-down causation means to act directly on a lower 
ontological or less complex level of reality without the intermediary of causes acting 
at this same level. Indeed, a majority of both top-down-causation supporters and 
detractors assume that it substitutes for the specific modes of action at lower 
ontological levels. It is easy to see that in this way, the principle of the closure of the 
physical world from the point of view of action and interaction would be violated in 
most cases, and at least in those where actions according to goals are involved. 
 
To this aim, considering the nature of causes and especially distinguishing between 
dynamic causes and non-dynamic causes [Auletta 2007d] is of primary importance. 
We may say that all causes have causal power, but only dynamic causes have causal 
effectiveness. Effectiveness means that the causal agent, in ideal condition, can 
positively give rise to a certain effect through interactions at the same ontological 
level, as when a ball moving with a certain speed is able, after collision, to set another 
ball in motion. Power means here concurring in the causal production of something, 
provided that there also is an effective causal factor. We have effective causal 
processes when there is an exchange of physical magnitudes. This can be understood, 
in general, through the so called “transference theory of causation” [Fair 1979, 
Salmon 1984, Dowe 1992, Salmon 1994, Dowe 1995]  
 
In our language, in fact, dynamic causes are same-level efficient causes, like thermal 
energy determining the melting of ice, or circular causes, which are those present in 
non-linear, self-increasing processes, like those commonly occurring in autocatalytic 
chemical reactions, for instance when a chemical X is involved in its own production 
as in  
 
 
A + X
k
−1
k1
 2X,  
where k1  and k−1  are reaction rate constants.  
 
Non-dynamic causes, on the contrary, are essentially of two types: Material causes 
(from below), which represent the support for processes and entities at a higher level 
of complexity, and can therefore be considered as possibility conditions for those 
processes and entities (for instance the various chemicals constituting the bio-
molecules and chemical processes underlying biological processes); and formal 
causes (from above), which are restrictions of the space of possibilities (for instance, 
during DNA replication, only certain chemical reactions are able to occur because of 
the context). 
 
Top-down causes are causes that do not act at the same ontological level (see Fig.1). 
They, notwithstanding, at least when information control is exerted, concur to produce 
certain effects when they are combined with dynamic causes at a lower level. Since 
top-down causes, in this context, also involve dynamic causation at the lower level, 
they do have causal effectiveness. However, since they do this through the specific 
mode of dynamic causation of the lower levels, and since dynamical causes are here 
understood as respecting physical conservation principles (this holds true both for 
efficient and circular causation), there is no violation of the closeness of physical 
causation.  Indeed, causal closure, from our point of view, is not broken if and only if 
principles of conservation of the relevant physical magnitudes are not violated. To 
avoid such a violation is sufficient to deny that the non-dynamic causes are 
responsible for the exchange of an additional amount of some conserved quantity. In 
conclusion, a careful application of the principle of closure of the physical world to 
different levels of complexity should lead to the result that it is impossible to 
dynamically act from one ontological level to another, either from above or from 
below, nevertheless, action according to goals is actually in play already at the most 
basic level considered here (that of molecular biology).   
 
Top-down causes can therefore be considered as a combination of formal causes from 
above, material causes from below, and operations embedded in circular causes 
(feedback circuits) at the middle ontological level [see Fig. 1b]. In a biological 
context, they can very often be understood as teleological causation, since goals play 
a decisive role as far as information control is involved. In fact, the equivalence 
classes coming into play in information control are precisely characterized by the 
goals to be attained (see Sect.4.2).  
 
4. Functional Equivalence Classes 
 
4.1 Operations and Their Conditions 
Operations are the elements of the functional equivalence classes we consider, here 
biochemical operations. Yet, an operation cannot be reduced to the pure (low-level) 
physical-chemical interactions per se but is rather a space-time pathway of such 
interactions; different pathways therefore define different operations. (Interactions are 
physical-chemical processes involving exchanges of physical magnitudes like charge, 
mass, energy, etc., or larger processes in which entire particles are shared or 
exchanged)  
 
There are three conditions for having such operations in biology:  
 
(1) A space of alternative possibilities from below (the material causes), without 
which one cannot have a set of different functionally equivalent operations. This set 
of multiple possibilities exists for micro-biological processes, since biopolymers are 
sufficiently complex to enter into–and be integrated in–very different forms of 
biological processes. For instance, catalysis can be performed by either RNA or 
protein molecules, two very different types of biopolymers. 
 
(2) Information selection: In order to have a specific operation we have to select 
some elements from the possibility space. This is actually a selection of information, 
since the elements involved are biomolecules whose primary structure indeed encodes 
information [Lehn 2004]. Information selection is a complex modality of information 
that is already present at the physical level, where it occurs at the most elementary 
level when there is interplay between at least two quantum-mechanical systems open 
to an environment [Auletta 2006]. The elements indispensable to information 
selection are the following. (a) Mutual information: When several systems share a 
common pool of information. For instance, when  there is a coupling of the receiver 
with the input-source. (b) A source of variety in the input information. Such a source 
of variety is very often due to random events, like many mutations in DNA, or even  
during epigeny or aging, and therefore plays an important role in biology. Even in 
cases where such variety is not random, what is important is that it is out of the 
control of the system it enters. This variety may be due to quantum uncertainty, or just 
to statistical fluctuations based in the fact that biological systems are made of many 
billions of discrete low-level units. The great American philosopher Charles S. Peirce 
[CP 1.159, 1.174, 1.302, 1.405, 5.119, 6.30-32, 6.57-59, 6.64] emphasized that in the 
world there is not only uniformity, but the principle of variety is “the most obtrusive 
character of the universe”, which “no mechanism can account for”. (c) A choice 
(decision) event selecting one of the incoming information variants. This might take 
place in a random way as in quantum measurement, where a component of the initial 
superposition state (the source of variety) is chosen randomly. In the biological 
domain, of all the environmental data (the source of variety) only certain are selected 
according to some criterion of relevance. In the case of microbiology, this is often 
through recognition of some bio-molecules by receptors and rejection of others, for 
example by neurotransmitter receptors in axons. This choice, however, being made 
between the options provided by the variety of incoming information, conveys some 
knowledge about the source system. 
 
Summarizing, in all its generality we define information selection as a decision event 
that selects particular input information through coupling with it.  As we shall see 
below, we have a second-degree of information selection, and therefore a true top-
down process when a controller makes a guess and selects relative to a certain goal. 
Here we also need a second-level information theory, semiotics (Sec.5.3). 
 
 (3)   Modularity: This means there are units that are somehow uncoupled from the    
external world in that they allow information hiding, encapsulation, hierarchy, and 
abstraction [Booch 1994]. As internal variables are hidden, external inputs do not 
always determine a unique reaction of a module, for their effects depend also on its 
internal state. Modularity, therefore, represents a sort of divergence in the effects. The 
internal operations of each module are then effectively decoupled from any other 
same-level module. This allows that an operation can be informationally controlled 
without being dynamically causally affected by other modules or foreign factors. 
Modules are connected in networks which are the operative contexts where top-down 
causation properly takes place. It may happen that a certain network can be a sub-
network (module) of a more complex network (see also Fig.3A).  
 
4.2 Networks and Operations 
Although the notion of network is used in a huge range of disciplines in the biological 
domain (see e.g. Barabas and Oltavi [2004], Schmid and MacMahon [2007]), it is 
usefully applicable to biochemistry only from the supra-molecular level upwards 
[Lehn 2004], and fits very well with our examination of equivalence classes and 
information control. Here, we employ a general notion of network understood as a 
cluster of interdependencies among units called nodes, without introducing specific 
assumptions about the nature either of the relations, or of the nodes. 
 
During the constitution of networks within biological systems, information selection 
indeed occurs: many different molecules (the space of possibilities representing the 
input information) come to be coupled, becoming in this way nodes of a net in which 
“choice” events are initially produced, giving rise to more significant nodes (hubs) 
that may be considered as selecting (and gathering) information from other nodes. 
When this network becomes modularized, it may instantiate a specific operation.  
 
For example, functional bio-molecular compounds such as RNA and proteins are 
structured entities showing a high degree of internal interconnection (see Fig.2). One 
can see RNA assembly and folding as a process of hierarchical and stepwise 
formation of a final network (the tertiary structure) through information selection, 
requiring first formation of specific helical elements through Watson-Crick base 
pairing. This defines the RNA secondary structure that is formally a network of 
hydrogen bonds occurring between complementary nucleotide residues (adenine (A) 
goes with uracil (U) and cytosine (C) goes with guanine (G)). In a second step, the 
presence of salts in the medium triggers the collapse of the secondary structure into 
structural intermediates through partial neutralization of the negative ribose phosphate 
backbone. Lastly, tertiary motifs that specify for particular tertiary contacts lead to the 
final native fold that is able to perform specific operations and therefore can carry 
inter-molecular recognition, catalytic, or mechanical functions. As shown in Fig.2, the 
final three-dimensional fold of an RNA molecule can be seen as a complex network 
of non-covalent interactions occurring between distant sites (or nodes) within the 
linear polymer sequence [Lescoute & Westhof, 2006].  
 
The folding of biomolecules can thus be formalized as a network in which several 
subunits can be individuated, each of them playing a definite role within that wider 
context. The various subunits are determined through information selection (which 
picks up elements from the space of possibilities) and, spontaneously interacting, 
constitute a concrete complex of interrelations. Hence, the subunits are the nodes of 
the network and the array of interdependences among nodes specifies a determinate 
pathway of physical-chemical interactions, that is, a definite operation (see for 
example Fig. 3A). Finally, thanks to modularity, such an operation (represented by the 
network) is shielded against external perturbations, and then controlled and reiterated, 
in a top-down fashion, by a higher-level network.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The hierarchical organization of the structure of an RNA biopolymer. 
From linear sequence information to 2D and 3D networks based on specific intra-molecular 
recognition. RNA biopolymers are informational and functional molecules that have the 
ability to fold and assemble into highly intricate three-dimensional architectures that take 
advantage of networks of specific tertiary interactions [Lescoute & Westhof, 2006]. 
 
 
Another example of a network is provided by interactome pathway maps, and as an 
isolated operation we may consider endocytosis, the operation through which some 
external molecule will be engulfed in a cell [Schmid and McMahon, 2007]. 
 
In many cases, some of the nodes of a network can be substituted by different suitable 
sets of chemicals without losing the overall features of the network itself. It is 
noteworthy that some nodes can be simply dropped without altering the effect of the 
whole pathway. This shows that the same function can be instantiated through 
different clusters of physical-chemical interactions.  
 
4.3 Equivalence Class Definition 
Mathematically, an equivalence relation is a type of relation on a set that provides a 
way for elements of that set to be identified with other elements of the set. Those 
elements considered equivalent through this identification form an equivalence class.
3
 
Let W be a set and let w, x, and y be elements of W. An equivalence relation, ~, on W 
is a relation on W that is, 
   Reflexive: w is equivalent to w for all w in W. 
   Symmetric: if w is equivalent to x, then x is equivalent to w. 
   Transitive: if w is equivalent to x and x is equivalent to y, then w is equivalent to y. 
 
If W is a set, w an element of W, and ~ an equivalence relation on W, the equivalence 
class of w is the set of all elements of W equivalent to w under ~. 
 
4.4 Functional Equivalence Classes 
As we have said, the concept of function is now widely acknowledged in biology. 
However, we emphasize that a function  defines an equivalence class. When one 
speaks of equivalence in general, one understands a "possibility of substitution in any 
context". It is fundamental that functional equivalence classes are on the contrary 
context-sensitive. The concept of equivalence class that is the object of this paper is 
therefore not a formal-logical construct but a pure functional-biological category, 
where different operations are considered functionally equivalent if they produce the 
same outcome for some functional purpose (the goal). Thus, we focus on functional 
equivalence classes rather than purely formal equivalence classes, even if the 
properties defined previously must also hold for them.  
 
To be specific, let us consider the biochemical subsystems that are required to 
synthesize a minimal cell: genome replication, transcription, translation, correct 
protein folding, and any necessary post-translational amino-acid modifications 
[Forster and Church, 2007]. Some of these abstract functions can be fulfilled by 
different pathways of physical-chemical interactions, i.e. by different operations (see 
Fig.3). When different operations fulfill the same function, they form an equivalence 
class (in this case the formal relations of Section 3.3 will be fulfilled). Since 
operations equivalent with respect to a certain function are not automatically 
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 Equivalence classes (see http://www.iscid.org/encyclopedia/Equivalence_Class) are based on 
equivalence relations (see http://www.iscid.org/encyclopedia/Equivalence_Relation). 
equivalent for other functions, it is important to identify unequivocally the function 
concerned. Therefore, the criterion by which items are judged to be or not to be 
members of such classes is only a specific function. In this way, functional 
equivalence classes are characterized by a part-whole relation, which, in turn, links a 
particular kind of function directly with the issue of signs (see Sec.5.3 below). It 
should be noted that good examples of biological systems belonging to a particular 
functional equivalence class are evolutionarily unrelated functional bio-molecules that 
result from convergent evolutionary processes. A clear example of functional 
equivalence class is provided by splicing, which is the process involved in the 
transition from pre-mRNA to mature mRNA. The function “splicing” is performed 
through different operations (making use of different chemicals, see Fig.4). Despite 
such a difference, the outcome is the same as far as the splicing is concerned. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Equivalence classes, operations, and functions.   
3(A) Two functionally equivalent networks. Different nodes and contacts specify for different 
operations. Modularity is readily apparent as some local nodes and related contacts are 
found at multiple locations within each network. The whole network can be seen as a 
hierarchical organization of smaller interchangeable lower order networks.  
3(B) Examples of operations and functions (see also Sec.2). If the two networks in A are taken 
as the three-dimensional structure of two RNA biopolymers that belong to the same functional 
class (e.g. Rnase P RNA), then some of their constitutive structural modules belong to lower-
level functional equivalence classes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Splicing. 
Splicing as an example of equivalence classes. Here, the fact that the different modes of 
operations indeed provide mRNA (as an outcome, and independently of the operations that 
mRNA can, in turn, perform relative to a further function) points out that these modes pertain 
to an equivalence class.  
 
 
Functional equivalence classes can contain multiple modules belonging to functional 
equivalence classes of lower complexity (Fig.3). The demonstration that lower 
functional equivalence classes are under hierarchical control of higher-level ones can 
be seen as evidence of top-down causation.  We recall that in order that a higher-level 
network can be considered as constituted by lower level sub-networks, each of them 
must produce the outcomes required by the functionality of the higher network, no 
matter what modes of operation they use to produce it. The way in which this 
hierarchical control is exerted is by means of information feedback control as we will 
see in the next section.  
 
During the constitution of an equivalence class, and in general when top-down 
causation through information control is at work, one can expect selection of fewer 
different types of structural motifs belonging to an equivalence class of larger 
networks than one would normally expect given the mere combination of lower-level 
elements (even smaller networks). This is due to the fact that the information of the 
network of higher complexity strongly affects the nature of information of the lower 
nodes, reducing the number of possibilities as the number of constraints within the 
larger system increases. The best analogy we have for RNA is that of a language. 
With RNA, it is possible to speak many “words” that have the same “meaning”, as 
they belong to an equivalence class. When these words are linked to one another, they 
define a “sentence” that conveys a greater meaning than its more basic components. 
Now the question might be whether it is the information of the words at the lower 
level that is affecting the information carried by the whole sentence, or the opposite. 
In fact, one can realize that what may be critical for the information carried by the 
whole sentence is the syntax that connects the words together, rather than the words 
themselves.  
 
5. Information Control  
 
5.1 What is Information Control? 
Since we are focusing on top-down causation by information control, we have now to 
see how information control should be characterised. 
 
One of the biggest misunderstandings in information theory is to have taken 
Shannon’s [1948] theory of communication (in the context of controlled transmission) 
as a general theory of information. In such a theory, centred on signal/noise 
discrimination, the message is already selected and well defined from the start, since 
from the start the selection operation among several alternative states (or bits) has 
already occurred (at the input or sender), and the problem here is only to faithfully 
transmit or further process, in the presence of disturbances, the sequence of bits that 
has been selected [Auletta 2007b]. On the contrary, a true information theory (as was 
Wiener’s [1948] original aim) starts with an input as a source of variety and has the 
selection only at the end of the process. In other words, a message here is only the 
message selected by the receiver. As a matter of fact, any information reception will 
be subject to the original variety, in addition to the consequences of disturbance, 
dispersion, or even of practical needs, and use of any of this information, at the most 
elementary level, already constitutes information selection. This is momentous for 
biological systems, since they are confronted with an environment that represents 
sources of uncertainty, and for this reason do not have control from the start of the 
string of bits that has been sent. Even inside a single cell we have such a problem, due 
to the modularisation of the different subsystems. The control process must here 
somehow be constructed while having only a limited pool of resources.  
 
Let us state the problem in this way. According to the traditional information 
(communication) theory, the main problem is reliability, understood as the matching 
between input and output. However, in biological processes we are much more 
interested in situations in which the receiver does not have full control over the input 
and is therefore forced to guess the nature of the input by taking the received partial 
information as a sign of it (revealing its nature). This provides the more basic 
condition for equivalence classes, in that it is possible to take a partial input as a sign 
of many (possible) different entire input situations, and to regard different inputs as 
equivalent under a certain point of view.  
 
At any biological level, the receiver is in general flooded with incoming data, and has 
to separate background data (important but constant) and noise (irrelevant data) from 
relevant information (data that are needed for some purpose). Therefore, information 
control consists in information selection–often involving a guess–from a certain point 
of view, and this represents the goal of the system. For instance, a bacterium 
searching for an energy source may use a specific temperature gradient (the received 
information) as a sign (see below Sec.5.3) of this source. Obviously, many different 
temperature distributions (within a certain window) will fit, and therefore allow it to 
reach a certain source, which is the goal. Moreover, any source that fits some general 
criterion will be good, and therefore pertains to the equivalence class established by 
the goal of acquiring energy. We need now to state how goals and feedback control 
are linked. Information control via feedback is not the only way to have control via 
information but it plays a fundamental role in living systems: It is indeed involved, for 
example, in any homeostatic process that a living system must perform to survive. 
 
5.2 Goals and Feedback Control 
We can speak of top-down causation by information control when there are two 
elements that cannot be reduced to any low-level explanation: 1. the formal structure 
determining the feedback control loop (the formal cause, in our language), and 2. the 
goal. These two elements represent the way the equivalence class is built in and 
controlled from above. To exercise information control, we need to join a system (the 
controller) with another system (the performer), see Fig.5. However, not all forms of 
connection will work, but only those satisfying the following requirements:  
   (a) the performer has to execute an operation in order to deploy the function needed 
by the controller, and  
   (b) the controller needs to be able to verify step by step if the function is actually 
deployed to the required degree.  
 
The requirement (a) is strictly linked to the fact that the controller has an inbuilt goal 
to reach; the requirement (b) is fulfilled by a feedback circuit (and an inbuilt 
comparator). It seems that mechanical devices, like a thermostat, are able to 
implement information control without any intervention of biological elements and in 
purely mechanical terms. This is however an erroneous point of view, since such 
devices have been built by humans to act in a certain way. Therefore, the functional 
element (and the goal) is already inbuilt. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The basic feedback control process.  
5.A: In living beings, feedback control underlies homeostatic processes (maintaining blood 
pressure, body temperature, etc.). The comparator determines the difference between the 
system state and the goal, and sends an error signal, activating the controller to correct the 
error. This is the way that goals (abstract variables) control dynamic causes, thus becoming 
causally effective. The goals in simple biological systems are genetically determined 
(unchanging through the organism’s life and constant across a species).  
5.B: The application of this framework to present-day cellular systems. We show the 
biopolymers involved in each step.  
 
Feedback control (see again Fig.5) is therefore the way information is causally 
effective in the biological world [Milsum 1966, Calow 1976, Ellis 2006a]. Feedback 
structuring is necessary in making information useful for attaining goals, otherwise 
the controller could not recognize whether it had succeeded in obtaining a desired 
outcome. In this way the controller is able to use a specific operation by a performing 
system as an element of a functional equivalence class.  
 
At lower biological levels, the goal is somehow built into the controller and does not 
itself need to be “chosen” (the situation is different when consciousness is involved). 
The goal-state (relative to a certain specific parameter) is not a need for the controller 
itself, an entity which is a part, a sub-system, of the whole biological system. 
Moreover, that the goal-state represents a need for the whole biological system does 
not mean this is an end in itself, since in general the exigency of keeping the system-
state coincident with the goal-state depends on the latter being crucial for other 
processes and functions, in turn indispensable for the whole system. An example of 
information control is the expression or the repression of segments of DNA. Indeed, 
this control procedure, done on strings containing information and through activators 
and repressors that carry and instantiate instructions, is highly contextual and depends 
on the goals that the organism pursues in different time windows and states of its 
developmental or metabolic activity.  
 
When an operation is actually performed, the fact that the outcome satisfies the goal 
(so that the comparator no longer sends error signals), can be seen as evidence for the 
operation’s pertaining to the equivalence class defined by the goal itself (this is the 
reason why functional equivalence class is not only an epistemic category). The goal 
can be satisfied by several slightly different outcomes, all of them falling into a well 
defined range of tolerance. In order for an operation to be acknowledged as a member 
of a functional equivalence class, it is sufficient to individuate a specific feature that is 
tightly bound with the outcome achievement. Therefore, when we speak of 
equivalence classes at a biological level (functional equivalence classes), we enter the 
domain of signs (see Sec.5.3). That the goal defines the equivalence class related to it 
is reminiscent of the concept of equifinality, a type of convergence, introduced by von 
Bertalanffy [1969] in the framework of general system theory.  
 
5.3 Signs and Equivalence Classes  
The connection between information control (and top-down causation) and 
equivalence classes, is exactly represented by the goals and the related issue of signs. 
  
In our usage, a sign is something that stands for something else in a certain context, or 
for a certain goal [Peirce CP: 2.228 and 1.540; Auletta 2007a, 2007c], and this is what 
establishes equivalence classes in a context of information control. Signs convey 
information that has to be recognised, and this occurs even in biological systems 
without consciousness [Hoffmeyer 1996; Deacon 1997]. 
 
As we have seen, in any information exchange we have selection at the end, not at the 
start. Signs, in the most elementary case, take this output selection as saying 
something about the input, so that the receiver starts a new information process 
aiming at the source (inverting somehow the ordinary flow of information from the 
source to the receiver, Fig.6). There are many examples of the use of signs in biology. 
Amongst the most remarkable ones are the so-called affordances [Gibson 1966, 
1979], when an animal takes a physical input (a smell) as sign of something that is 
fundamental for survival (food). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Information and signs.  
Input information, as a source of variety, starts an informational process that is concluded 
when information selection is accomplished. When this selected element is taken to say 
something about the input information, we have a semiotic relation and say that it is a sign of 
the input. This is evidently true when this element is tightly connected with that complex of 
initial information; something, however, can also be a sign of things that are not obvious 
consequences of the input information, for instance when certain items are taken to be a sign 
of the needed element (able to satisfy the goal). 
 
 
With respect to equivalence classes, the outcome of the operation performed in a 
certain biological context may be considered as a sign of the function being deployed 
successfully (or not), and hence that the operation really is (or not) a member of the 
equivalence class. In other words, of all the input information entrained in the 
physical-chemical properties of the molecule or of the interaction under consideration, 
a single feature is selected and taken as sign of the function required by the inbuilt 
goals of the whole system (as we have said, it is a part-whole relation). This sign may 
be the outcome of the operation, or any of its features reliably associated to the 
outcome. Let us call this sign a mark of the operation. Systems able to perform a 
certain operation for a certain goal are acknowledged through a specific mark, and 
controlled in their mode of operation through such a mark. Thus, the informational 
control of an operation (see Sec.5.2) is a genuine semiotic process, since the control 
instance needs to catch and select specific information as a sign of the fact that things 
are going in the right or the wrong way. 
 
5.4 Functional Selection and Top-Down Causation  
In many cases, new information is acquired through functional selection–and 
therefore specialization–of determined operations at the lower level. Strong evidence 
for this process is given by mutation and heritage of epigenetic mechanisms, like the 
restoration of native folding of single stranded DNA sequences through reverse 
mutations [Shepherd et al, 2006]. When such a specialization occurs, it becomes truly 
useful for attaining a certain higher-level goal, once it is linked to the previous set of 
controllable information of the biological system through a feedback loop, eventually 
establishing and maintaining a new functionality. Such a process is also known, at 
evolutionary scale, as exaptation and consists in general in the use of adaptive traits in 
a new context that is different from that in which they have originally arisen [Gould 
and Verba, 1982]. This situation also enables biological systems to undergo adaptive 
selection at a functional level. 
  
An excellent example is the transition from an RNA-based genome to the DNA-based 
genome [Jaeger & Westhof, 2001; Lehninger et al, 2004]. RNA shows two 
fundamental chemical instabilities: (1) Instability of the ribose-phosphate backbone 
that can hydrolyse inherent to the presence of a hydroxyl group at the level of the 
sugar moiety, and (2) instability of cytosine that can hydrolyse into uracil. At this 
level, these instabilities prevent the genome from growing too much due to an 
increasing loss of information through these chemical instabilities, and this represents 
a limitation of information coding. To circumvent this major problem, two new 
metabolic pathways have been developed through adaptive processes. One 
corresponds to the formation of deoxy-nucleotides from nucleotides, removing the 
first instability. The second one is much more remarkable, and consists in the 
transformation of uracils into thymines by addition of one carbon methyl to the base. 
The last change allows a mechanism to repair a damaged or mutated genome to 
emerge.   
 
This key step in evolution provides a better vehicle of information coding (DNA) as 
well as allowing RNA to be more dedicated to operative tasks rather than to long-term 
storage functions within the cell. It also provides the cell with a better control over the 
expression of its various functional components (DNA, proteins, and RNA) by 
allowing modulation and better timing control. In other words, this increase in 
information control corresponds to an increase of the modularity of the biological 
system by specialization of its functional tasks. Obviously, such a specialization may 
work only if it happens in a suitable network of information control. 
 
5.5 Our Whole Conceptual Framework 
Top-down causation by information control occurs thanks to the connection between 
equivalence classes and information control. We have top-down causation by 
information control when, once an equivalence class has been established, the 
information selection defining the operations which are the elements of the class is 
conserved, thanks to modularity, despite the variability of lower level variables. In 
this case, the feedback control circuits produce reliable responses to higher-level 
information [Ellis 2006b, 2008], allowing equivalence classes of lower level 
operations that give the same higher-level response for a certain goal. As equivalence 
classes are abstract configurations rather than physical states, and are (through the 
lower level modality of operations) the causally effective higher-level entities in this 
context, we have top-down causation that cannot be reduced to any specific bottom-up 
or same-level causation. The system as a whole is illustrated in Fig.7. 
 
6. Biological Modelling 
 
6.1 A Model of an Equivalence Class  
The concept of equivalence class is readily available at the level of stable RNA 
biopolymers. Sequence and structural analysis of natural RNA molecules such as 
large self-folding catalytic RNAs (group I and group II introns, RNase P RNA, 
ribosomal RNAs) reveal that their conserved structural catalytic cores are often 
stabilized by peripheral modules or tertiary motifs that, despite their different local 
structures, contribute in a similar fashion to the final core assembly and stabilization 
[Jaeger et al. 1994, Jaeger et al. 1996; Westhof et al. 1996, Massire et al. 1997; 
Massire et al. 1998].  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Top-down causation.  
The relations between the elements involved in our theoretical scheme. The arrows show the 
conditions that contribute to the establishment of an operation. 
 
 
As shown in Fig.8.A, the 2D structural networks of two different molecules of RNase 
P RNA have a conserved structural core able to perform the same catalytic function 
that is the maturation of tRNAs (see also Figs.2-3). They however differ in their 
peripheral regions, which are involved in the proper intra-molecular recognition of 
their two constitutive domains. As seen in Figs.8.B and 8.C, this intra-molecular 
recognition function that allows spatially forming a tertiary contact between the 
helical element P9 and the helical element P1 is operated by two kinds of tertiary 
structural motifs that have different sequences and three-dimensional structures. For 
this reason, the modality of operations is also different. However, these two specific 
operations (and the related different tertiary motifs) are perfect examples of items 
belonging to the same equivalence class (RNA-RNA recognition). These components 
have been shown to be swappable within the structural context of a group I ribozyme, 
demonstrating that they are functionally equivalent [Jaeger et al. 1994]. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Operations and Functional Equivalence.  
Different operations connected with differences in networks that are notwithstanding 
functionally equivalent (Adapted with permission from Massire et al, 1997). Top: RNase P 
RNA of type A, Bottom: RNase P RNA of type B. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.2 Experiments on Top-Down Causation   
Notwithstanding the interesting results reported in Sec. 6.1, we wish to find stronger 
evidence for top-down causation by showing the establishment of equivalence classes 
by systems displaying information control. In Sec.2 we have reported about an 
important experiment showing that, notwithstanding differences at the physical-
chemical level, enzymes pertaining to different organisms can be interchanged 
without losing their functionality. In our opinion, their experiment is a beautiful 
instance of the fact that different lower-level operations are informationally controlled 
from above and constitute or may constitute functional equivalence classes.  
 
For this reason, the experiment by Wegscheid et al. can be framed within a general 
model for testing top-down-causation. Here (see Fig. 9.A), one takes a unicellular 
organism X and identifies an operation a (we recall that an operation is a pathway of 
physical-chemical interactions) deploying a certain function in X (for example, the 
maturation of tRNA). Then, one takes another organism Y deploying an alternative 
operation b and substitute it for a in X. Then, one considers whether the operation b is 
able to deploy the same function in the new context. If operation b is actually 
“accepted” by the organism X, then the role of functional equivalence class for that 
organism is proved to the extent to which the specific interaction-pathway is 
disregarded and only the function taken into account. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Demonstration of functional equivalence within the metabolic network of an 
unicellular organism. Colours here do not follow the  previous conventions.  
9.A: See text.  
9.B: The same function can be carried out by molecules with different operations. Operations 
a and b, which are carried out by RNA alone, are different due to the way they fold. 
Operation c takes advantage of a protein to help the RNA fold. Operation d is mediated by 
protein alone at the assembly and catalytic levels.  
 
 
This means that the equivalence class in this case is established inside a single 
organism, suggesting that this happens through an information-control feedback loop. 
Notice that trans-individual equivalence classes (as in the experiments reported in 
Sec. 6.1) could not be considered as evidence for top-down causation but rather as a 
way the scientist classifies certain physical and chemical interactions. In fact, in this 
case what happens within two (or more) different organisms could be explained in 
purely mechanical and bottom-up terms in each organism separately. When, on the 
contrary, a single organism X is able to deploy a certain function either by performing 
operation a or b, that can be no longer understood in a purely mechanistic way, and 
what becomes of primary importance is the goal the operation is aiming at (and the 
control instance piloting the process).  
 
However, within the context of the Wegscheid experiment, it is important to stress 
that while type A and type B RNase P have significantly different architectures, they 
are still evolutionary related as their secondary structure and tertiary structure share a 
consensual catalytic site for binding and cleaving tRNA molecules. The two 
architectures are both resulting from the evolutionary divergence of a common RNase 
P RNA ancestor. This is clearly established by extensive sequence comparative 
analysis and crystallographic analysis of the structure of the two classes of RNase P 
RNA [e.g. Altman 2007, Kirsebom 2007]. Type A and type B RNase P enzymes have 
evolved through time to retaining in their common structural core all the specific 
structural determinants for performing the same catalytic reaction of maturation of 
pretRNAs. Therefore, a reductionist explanation such as the one proposed by 
Wegscheid et al for their experiment cannot be completely ruled out. 
The basic scheme of the type of experiment proposed is quite common in genetics, 
when a gene coding for a certain function is substituted by another similar one 
presenting some genetic variations. 
 
Therefore, what we really want to perform is an experiment of substitution of 
molecules of the same function but with different modes of structural and functional 
operations, meaning different ways to perform the catalysis and recognize the 
substrate. This would show that two different evolutionarily unrelated molecular 
systems that share the same function by convergent evolution can substitute for one 
another. In fact, in living cells, there are numerous examples of such types of systems 
(e.g. DNA nucleases, amino acyl tRNA synthetases, Self-splicing introns, self-
cleaving ribozymes…).  
 
Therefore, a further refinement of the experiment (Fig. 9.B) described above could be 
to eventually substitute a key cellular operation performed by a protein (like a 
nuclease activity) by one performed by an RNA. The functional RNA does not have 
to be of natural origin as it can eventually result from in vitro experiments [e.g. Jaeger 
1997, Chworos & Jaeger 2007]. In this case, while the function could be the same 
(this is our prediction), any level of organization below that one would be different, 
allowing demonstration of top-down causation by information control without 
ambiguity. Here, we assumed that the organism-level is higher than that of operations, 
and therefore anything that could be swapped, maintaining the same cell activity and 
its outcomes, is seen as an effect of top-down causation. 
 
6.3 A Research Program 
With this paper we propose a new research program, through which we try to 
experimentally establish top-down causation. It is obviously a very difficult issue, and 
probably many experimental steps as well as new types of experiments will be 
necessary. However, we also believe that, given the conceptual framework developed 
here, it is a possible enterprise.  
 
It is always difficult to positively prove a result, so one may wonder whether it is 
possible to positively prove top-down causation. In complex cases, one could always 
object that there will be at some time a purely molecular (and bottom-up) explanation 
of the eventual findings we are aiming at. However, showing that equivalence classes 
are constituted at the most basic bio-molecular level represents a strong 
counterexample to all bottom-up and same-level explanations, strongly suggesting 
top-down causation as a fruitful way to understand these results. It will also help to 
explain issues regarding emergence and related evolutionary aspects  that constitute 
the major part of our future programme. It should be also clear that a possible failure 
of our research does not necessarily imply a direct confutation of top-down causation. 
Other ways to search for it, both at the microbiological level and at higher levels of 
complexity, are likely to be found.  
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